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Liyang Tang1,2Abstract
Background: The main aim of China’s Health Care System Reform was to help the decision maker find the optimal
solution to China’s institutional problem of health care provider selection. A pilot health care provider research
system was recently organized in China’s health care system, and it could efficiently collect the data for
determining the optimal solution to China’s institutional problem of health care provider selection from various
experts, then the purpose of this study was to apply the optimal implementation methodology to help the
decision maker effectively promote various experts’ views into various optimal solutions to this problem under the
support of this pilot system.
Methods: After the general framework of China’s institutional problem of health care provider selection was
established, this study collaborated with the National Bureau of Statistics of China to commission a large-scale 2009
to 2010 national expert survey (n = 3,914) through the organization of a pilot health care provider research system
for the first time in China, and the analytic network process (ANP) implementation methodology was adopted to
analyze the dataset from this survey.
Results: The market-oriented health care provider approach was the optimal solution to China’s institutional
problem of health care provider selection from the doctors’ point of view; the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach was the optimal solution to China’s institutional problem of health care
provider selection from the pharmacists’ point of view, the hospital administrators’ point of view, and the point of
view of health officials in health administration departments; the public private partnership (PPP) approach was the
optimal solution to China’s institutional problem of health care provider selection from the nurses’ point of view,
the point of view of officials in medical insurance agencies, and the health care researchers’ point of view.
Conclusions: The data collected through a pilot health care provider research system in the 2009 to 2010 national
expert survey could help the decision maker effectively promote various experts’ views into various optimal
solutions to China’s institutional problem of health care provider selection.
(Continued on next page)Correspondence: tly09@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
1Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management,
Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
2Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA
© 2013 Tang; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Tang Health Research Policy and Systems 2013, 11:11 Page 2 of 20
http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/11/1/11(Continued from previous page)
Keywords: Analytic network process, China’s Health Care System Reform, Decision maker, Economy, Effectiveness,
Efficiency, Equity, Experts’ views, Health care provider research system, Health care provider selection, Institutional
problemBackground
The year 2007 could be taken as the start of China’s
Health Care System Reform, as it was in this year that
the Chinese government made an unprecedented com-
mitment to improve the quality and expand the breadth
of health care through a 2020 reform scheme. Through
this reform scheme a new national health care system
covering every Chinese citizen would be realized [1,2].
In 2009 this commitment was re-proposed and drew
further attention. Driven by the Inter-Ministerial Health
Care Reform Group of the State Council, the aggressive
2020 goal that was adjusted in 2009 sat atop the follow-
ing four major pillars of the draft scheme [3-6]:
1. Improving public health;
2. Enhancing the medical insurance and welfare
system;
3. Improving the quality and efficiency of hospitals
through the enhanced management and monitoring;
4. Improving basic medical services.
The main aim of China’s Health Care System Reform
was to help the decision maker find the optimal solution
to China’s institutional problem of health care provider
selection [7]. In the implementation of China’s Health
Care System Reform, the expectation of the whole
society forced various health care institutions to provide
their products and services for the public more efficiently,
more economically, more effectively, and more equally. The
decision maker came to realize that the traditional govern-
ment’s regulation-oriented health care provider approach
may no longer be the optimal approach, making a reform
for the selection of health care providers urgently needed
[3-7]. In fact the selection of health care providers has also
received considerable attention in the literature, and its
increasing importance has forced the decision maker to re-
think both the traditional evaluation strategies and the trad-
itional regulation strategies on China’s institutional problem
of health care provider selection [8-11]. On the basis of the
current situation of China’s health care system, the possible
alternative approaches include the public private partner-
ship (PPP) approach and the market-oriented health care
provider approach [7]. Obviously, each type of health care
provider has its own difficulties and problems in achieving
the exciting 2020 goal, but many optimal mechanisms and
systems that can easily solve these difficulties and problems
are also found in China’s health care system [3-7]. Since
inefficiency, diseconomy, ineffectiveness, and inequityissues in China’s health care system must be taken seriously,
efficiency, economy, effectiveness, and equity can be taken
as the major sub-goals of China’s institutional problem
of health care provider selection (there may be other
sub-goals of China’s institutional problem of health care
provider selection, but they are usually the relatively
minor sub-goals of this problem) [3-7,12]. Since there
are tradeoffs between these sub-goals with respect to
each type of health care provider, the decision maker
needs to balance the advantages and disadvantages of
various optimal mechanisms and systems in order to
find the optimal solution to China’s institutional problem
of health care provider selection that takes all sub-goals as
a whole [7,13].
Various experts have had various views on China’s
institutional problem of health care provider selection, and
their views have usually been collected through research
projects, public-opinion solicitation of the government,
and media interviews. Specifically, the early literature
suggested two opposite solutions to China’s institutional
problem of health care provider selection. One solution
was putting health care providers under the strict and
complete administration of the government, and its sup-
porters included a small proportion of medical practitioners
(doctors, pharmacists, nurses, and hospital administrators),
a large proportion of officials (officials in health adminis-
tration departments and medical insurance agencies), and
a small proportion of health care researchers (in colleges,
universities, and research departments). The other solu-
tion was the marketization of health care providers, and
its supporters included a large proportion of medical
practitioners, a small proportion of officials, and a large
proportion of health care researchers [7,10,11,14].
The characteristics of putting health care providers
under the strict and complete administration of the
government were as follows: in financial terms, all health
care institutions were managed in the form of “separation
of revenue and expenditure” by the health administration
departments; in medical device/medicine terms, the health
administration departments implemented the uniform
bidding and purchasing for all health care institutions; in
personnel terms, the health administration departments
were responsible for the appointment/hiring of both the
deans and the deputy deans of all health care institutions;
in price terms, the prices of health care services, medical
devices, and medicines were under the unified control of
the government’s price departments; generally speaking,
in this administration system, a health care institution that
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independent legal person qualification [10,11,14]. The
marketization of health care providers supported the
following point of view: in any health care field, as long as
the competition exists, the market must be established,
and both public and private health care institutions must
play fairly in the same market environment [9,15], because
only when the government opens up the health care
market and expedites the privatization of health care, it is
possible to efficiently allocate a large number of medical
resources [8]. Here the privatization of health care meant
that private for-profit/non-profit health care institutions
could enter the health care market freely, and various
experts had the most controversial views on this sub-
problem of China’s institutional problem of health care
provider selection [14-18].
Based on the above two possible solutions, the Public
Policy Research Department of China’s Economic Reform
Research Society further put forward three comparative
points of view, involving the administrative-oriented point
of view, the conservative market-oriented point of view,
and the progressive market-oriented point of view [7].
The administrative-oriented point of view that was mainly
supported by officials suggested that the Chinese govern-
ment should use the public power to limit the business
scope of private health care institutions in order to make
them as the complementary part of the health care market
and maintain the dominant position of public health care
institutions in the health care market [7]. The conservative
market-oriented point of view that was mainly supported
by health care researchers was in favor of an open market
that the certified private health care institutions could
enter, but it designated a framework of “strengthening the
control of both the large-scale and small-scale private
health care institutions, and loosening the control of the
medium-scale private health care institutions” [7]. The
progressive market-oriented point of view that was mainly
supported by medical practitioners did not support the
restriction of the scope of the health care privatization,
and it believed that the business scopes of both public and
private health care institutions should depend on the
competition result of a level playing field, rather than the
government’s administrative arrangement [7,19,20].
Up till now, an authoritative study that helped the
decision maker effectively promote various experts’ views
into various optimal solutions to China’s institutional prob-
lem of health care provider selection has been lacking. This
situation is mainly due to the lack of an authoritative
health care provider research system, since such a system
can most efficiently collect the data for determining the
optimal solution to China’s institutional problem of health
care provider selection from various experts. This situation
is also partly due to the fact that few implementation
methodologies can meet the requirement of the difficultproblem-solving process, since this problem-solving
process involves an analysis of interdependent activities
whose critical attributes include intangible elements. In
the literature, a number of implementation methodologies
have been applied to solve China’s institutional problem of
health care provider selection, such as qualitative methods
[7] and statistical methods [21]; however, none of them
could handle the possible interactions among decision
factors/constraints in the complex multi-stage setting in
this problem, so they were not the effective implementation
methodologies that could help the decision maker effect-
ively promote various experts’ views into various optimal
solutions to China’s institutional problem of health care
provider selection.
The construction of the health care provider research
system has been the weakness of the construction of
China’s health care system for a long time and this prob-
lem has significantly blocked China’s Health Care System
Reform, as the decision maker could not effectively
promote various experts’ views into various optimal
solutions to China’s institutional problem of health care
provider selection without the organization of an authorita-
tive health care provider research system [22-29]. In order
to help the decision maker determine the optimal solution
to China’s institutional problem of health care provider
selection on the basis of various experts’ views on this
problem, a pilot health care provider research system was
recently organized in China’s health care system. Since this
pilot health care provider research system could efficiently
collect the data for determining the optimal solution to
China’s institutional problem of health care provider selec-
tion from various experts, the purpose of this study was to
apply the optimal implementation methodology to help the
decision maker effectively promote various experts’ views
into various optimal solutions to this problem under the
support of this pilot system.
Methods
The general framework of China’s institutional problem of
health care provider selection
In order to generally examine various health care provider
approaches based on various experts’ views on China’s
institutional problem of health care provider selection,
the general framework of this problem was established,
incorporating the following important considerations:
 Tangible/intangible attributes and strategic
attributes;
 Dependencies between attributes;
 Preferences for attributes with respect to different
types of health care;
 Preferences and inter-relationships of health care
providers with respect to different stages of
health care.
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ferred to as a cluster, and there were six clusters below
the overall goal on the basis of the above important
considerations: the activity cluster, the regulatory clus-
ter, the market cluster, the alternative cluster, the criter-
ion cluster, and the strategic cluster. The dependency
relationship between attributes within a cluster was
called inner-dependency, denoted by a directed loop at
the cluster. A two-way dependency relationship between
attributes in two different clusters was called inter-
dependency, denoted by a two-way directed arc between
the clusters.
The following two aspects for the activity cluster, the
regulatory cluster, and the market cluster should be
taken seriously: complementarities of resources and
capabilities, the commitment and mutuality of social/
business needs. Complementarities of resources and
capabilities helped the health care system gain new
resources and capabilities via strategic alliances and
strategic networks, resulting in access to new information,
new technologies, and new markets [30,31]. The commit-
ment and mutuality of social/business needs were the
critical aspect that dictated how well resources and
capabilities contributed to the sustainable partnership
among participants of the health care market. These
two aspects were also inter-related.
The following six subsections developed the underlying
concepts that constituted the generic set of factors for the
general framework of China’s institutional problem of
health care provider selection.
Selection of activity attributes
Activity attributes reflect the specifications/characteristics
embodied in health care related activities, and they are






Figure 1 The general framework of China’s institutional problem of hnon-basic health care, health care and insurance system,
and medicine/medical device supply.
Selection of regulatory attributes
Regulatory attributes are organized into two parts, namely,
management system, and supervision/monitoring.
In order to solve the institutional problem of health
care provider selection, the decision maker must con-
sider whether different health care providers should
possess differentiated medical devices, differentiated
human capitals, and differentiated medical technology
advantages that are complementary to each other. In
order to ensure a sustainable partnership among par-
ticipants of the health care market, the decision maker
must evaluate health care providers’ service reputation,
organizational processes, abilities to offer customers
adaptations/customizations, intra-organizational com-
patibilities, etc. [32-34]. In the regulatory cluster, the
management system attribute mainly refers to the ad-
ministrative control of the health care market, and the
supervision/monitoring attribute mainly refers to the
regulatory control of the health care market.
Selection of market attributes
Market attributes are organized into three parts,
namely, compensation choice, health insurance system,
and financing.
Here the compensation choice attribute mainly refers
to the government’s choice between compensating the
supply-side and compensating the demand-side in the
health care market. The health insurance system, regu-
lated by the government’s medical insurance agency and
insurance regulatory commission, is a major part of the
health care market, and it is responsible for the health





ealth care provider selection.
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participants in health care financing.
Selection of alternatives
The alternative cluster is composed of alternative ap-
proaches for the selection of health care providers. Each
alternative approach is assessed with respect to all
attributes in the activity cluster, the regulatory cluster,
and the market cluster [35]. On the basis of both various
experts’ various views on China’s institutional problem
of health care provider selection in the literature and the
current situation of China’s health care system, the most
viable alternative approaches include the traditional
government’s regulation-oriented health care provider
approach, the PPP approach, and the market-oriented
health care provider approach. These alternative ap-
proaches, distinguished by all attributes in the activity
cluster, the regulatory cluster, and the market cluster,
are explored with respect to China’s institutional problem
of health care provider selection:
Alternative approach 1: The traditional government’s
regulation-oriented health care provider approach
1. Basic health care: it is under both the comprehensive
executive order and the complete control of the
government, only the public health care institution
acts as the supplier of basic health care.
2. Non-basic health care: it is mainly administrative-
oriented and partly market-oriented, under the
control of the government the private for-profit
/non-profit health care institution can enter the
non-basic health care market, the government uses
the public power to maintain the dominant position
of the public health care institution and limit the
business scope of the private health care institution
to make it as the complementary part of the
non-basic health care market.
3. Health care and insurance system: a publicly-funded
health care system without the “internal market
reform” is implemented, and it is responsible for both
basic health care and public health of the whole
society. The government implements a mandatory
social health insurance system as the backbone of the
medical security system, under the control of the
government both the medical aid system and the
commercial health insurance system play the role of
complementary health insurance system.
4. Medicine/medical device supply: the desired
medicine/medical device is mainly supplied by the
public interest institution, and the incentives of the
public interest institution for medicine/medical
device supply are meeting its national/social
objectives. Here other major indicators such as
medicine/medical device production facilities, R&D,production management, and supply chain should
also be assessed for this attribute.
5. Management system: the government imposes the
complete command and control (involving the
implementation of “separation of revenue and
expenditure”) on the public health care institution,
and the business scope of the public health care
institution is limited to a certain extent by the
government. The private for-profit/non-profit health
care institution that is subject to the government’s
regulation suffers discriminatory treatment in many
aspects, since it is treated only as the
complementary part of the health care market by
the government.
6. Supervision/Monitoring: the setting of standards for
both price and quality of health care and the work
of addressing the potential market failures are
mainly done by the government. The aim of the
government’s supervision and monitoring is to
achieve a guaranteed minimum outcome of health
care provision.
7. Compensation choice: the government mainly
compensates the supply-side in the health care
market, and the public health care institution is
compensated to provide appropriate health care for
the public through a top-down performance
assessment by the government.
8. Health insurance system: a mandatory social health
insurance system is implemented as the backbone of
the medical security system, and it is responsible for
the reimbursement of basic health care of the
public. Under the government’s control, both the
commercial health insurance system and the medical
aid system are only responsible for the
reimbursement of non-basic health care of the
insured person.
9. Financing: the financing of health care mainly refers
to public financing from both the central/local
government and the state owned enterprise.
Alternative approach 2: The PPP approach
1. Basic health care: the government, the public health
care institution, and the private for-profit/non-profit
health care institution jointly participate in defining
both the social objectives and the implementation
methods of basic health care. Here, the public health
care institution acts as the major supplier, and the
private for-profit/non-profit health care institution
acts as the auxiliary supplier.
2. Non-basic health care: both the social objectives and
the implementation methods of non-basic health
care are also defined by the government, the public
health care institution, and the private for-profit
/non-profit health care institution, but in the
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of health care institution mainly depends on the
competition result of a level playing field.
3. Health care and insurance system: a publicly-funded
health care system without the “internal market
reform” is currently implemented, and it is
responsible for both basic health care and public
health of the whole society, but the “internal market
reform” will be implemented step by step, and
ultimately the publicly-funded health care system
will be replaced by the social health system. The
government currently implements a mandatory
social health insurance system as the backbone of
the medical security system, but the mandatory
social health insurance system will be gradually
replaced by a non-mandatory multilevel public
health insurance system. Both the medical aid
system and the commercial health insurance system
are treated as complementary health insurance
systems by the government.
4. Medicine/medical device supply: the desired
medicine/medical device is mainly supplied by both
the public interest institution and the private
for-profit/non-profit institution. The incentives of
the public interest institution for medicine/medical
device supply are meeting its national/social
objectives, whereas those of the private for-profit
institution are making profit, and those of the
private non-profit institution are meeting its social/
organizational objectives. Here, other major
indicators such as medicine/medical device
production facilities, R&D, production management,
supply chain, and private medicine/medical device
firms should also be assessed for this attribute.
5. Management system: the government imposes the
evaluation and supervision on the public health care
institution, and the business scope of the public health
care institution mainly depends on the qualification
authentication. The private for-profit/non-profit
health care institution is under the government’s
regulation, and the business scope of the private
for-profit/non-profit health care institution mainly
depends on the government’s judgment of the health
care needs of the whole society.
6. Supervision/Monitoring: the setting of standards for
both price and quality of health care and the work
of addressing the potential market failures are
mainly done by the government and partly done by
the civic organization. The aim of the government’s
supervision and monitoring is to achieve a
guaranteed minimum outcome of health care
provision, while the aim of the civic organization’s
supervision and monitoring is to meet its social/
organizational objectives.7. Compensation choice: whether the government
chooses to compensate the supply-side or the
demand-side in the health care market depends on
the type of health care, the government usually
compensates the supply-side for basic health care,
but the government usually compensates the
demand-side for non-basic health care.
8. Health insurance system: a mandatory social health
insurance system is currently implemented as the
backbone of the medical security system, and it is
responsible for the reimbursement of basic health
care of the public. However, the non-mandatory
multilevel public health insurance system that
provides the customized insurance packages for the
whole society will be implemented and will gradually
replace the mandatory social health insurance
system. Both the commercial health insurance
system and the medical aid system that mainly
consist of the private for-profit/non-profit institution
are responsible for the reimbursement of non-basic
health care of the insured person.
9. Financing: the financing of health care is composed
of both public and private financing, here, public
financing is mainly from both the central/local
government and the state owned enterprise, and
private financing is mainly from the private financial
institution.
Alternative approach 3: The market-oriented health
care provider approach
1. Basic health care: both the public health care
institution and the private for-profit/non-profit
health care institution can enter the basic health
care market freely. The business scope of any type of
health care institution mainly depends on the
qualification authentication, and all types of health
care institutions can compete in a fair environment
under the government’s regulation.
2. Non-basic health care: all types of health care
institutions can enter the non-basic health care
market freely, and the business scope of any type of
health care institution mainly depends on the
competition result of a level playing field under the
government’s regulation.
3. Health care and insurance system: the “internal
market reform” is implemented and the publicly-
funded health care system is replaced by the social
health system. In fact, this process is similar to the
internal market reform of the British National
Health Service, the state designates a number of
districts, and in each district a regulatory body is
established to act as the buyer of health care
services, and according to the population, age,
disease type, morbidity, and other factors of the
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allocation of health care expenses and appropriate
funds to these regulatory bodies that are responsible
for supplying both basic public health services and
basic health care services to the public free of
charge. A non-mandatory multilevel public health
insurance system is implemented as the backbone of
the medical security system, while both the medical
aid system and the commercial health insurance
system also play important roles in the health
insurance system.
4. Medicine/medical device supply: the desired
medicine/medical device is mainly supplied by the
private for-profit institution and partly supplied by
both the public interest institution and the private
non-profit institution. The private for-profit
institution’s incentives for medicine/medical device
supply are making profit. Here, other major
indicators such as medicine/medical device
production facilities, R&D, production regulation,
supply chain, and private medicine/medical device
firms should also be assessed for this attribute.
5. Management system: the government exercises the
functions of an independent regulator and treats
both the public health care institution and the
private for-profit/non-profit health care institution
fairly. The business scope of any type of health care
institution mainly depends on either the
qualification authentication or the competition
result of a level playing field.
6. Supervision/Monitoring: the setting of standards for
both price and quality of health care and the work
of addressing the potential market failures are
mainly done by both the government and the civic
organization. The aim of the government’s
supervision and monitoring is to achieve a
guaranteed minimum outcome of health care
provision, while the aim of the civic organization’s
supervision and monitoring is to meet its social/
organizational objectives.
7. Compensation choice: the government mainly
compensates the demand-side in both the basic
health care market and the non-basic health care
market. Specifically, the government not only
provides health care subsidies for patients, but also
provides health insurance subsidies for the poor.
8. Health insurance system: a non-mandatory public
health insurance system is implemented as the
backbone of the medical security system. In fact, this
multilevel public health insurance system provides
the customized insurance packages for the whole
society, and it is responsible for the reimbursement
of customized health care of the insured person.
Both the commercial health insurance system andthe medical aid system that mainly consist of the
private for-profit/non-profit institution are
responsible for the reimbursement of appropriate
health care of the insured person.
9. Financing: the financing of health care mainly refers
to private financing from the private financial
institution.
Selection of criteria attributes
The overall goal for China’s institutional problem of
health care provider selection can be separated into four
sub-goals, and they are organized as criteria attributes,
involving efficiency, economy, effectiveness, and equity,
in the problem-solving process, each of them is treated
as a separate hierarchy [36,37].
1. Efficiency: the efficiency attribute explores how
medical resources are translated into health care. An
efficient operation maximizes the health care
provision for a given set of medical resources, or it
minimizes the medical resources required to achieve
a given goal of health care provision.
2. Economy: the economy attribute explores whether
medical resources are acquired at the lowest cost
and at the right time, and whether the method of
producing the requisite health care is economical.
3. Effectiveness: the effectiveness attribute explores the
extent to which the health care provision of the
health care institution achieves the desired outcome.
4. Equity: the equity attribute explores whether health
care is being provided impartially, fairly, and
equitably, and reflects the extent to which the health
care institution has achieved and has been able to
maintain an equitable supply of comparable health
care across demographic groups, regions, urban and
rural areas, and so on.
Selection of strategic attributes
The following seven strategic attributes are the central
attributes that link together activity attributes, regulatory
attributes, and market attributes for the institutional
problem of health care provider selection [37,38].
1. Market potential: the market potential attribute
reflects the profitability of the health care market for
the private health care institution. Both the regional
natural monopoly of health care and the stable
return on investment are the major incentives for
the involvement of the private health care institution
in health care provision.
2. Institutional guarantee: the institutional guarantee
attribute reflects the extent to which the
institutional and legal system, the government’s
regulation, and the political will of the senior
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health care institution and facilitate the efficient PPP
operation. Unguaranteed institutional systems
increase uncertainty and risk in both the private
health care institution and the PPP operation, thus
weakening the willingness of the private for-profit
/non-profit health care institution to participate in
health care provision.
3. Government credibility: the government credibility
attribute mainly refers to how the government
exercises its rights and supervision powers in
alignment with laws and regulations. Government
credibility is crucial for the private for-profit/non-
profit investment in health care. The key
contributors for guaranteeing government credibility
include political checks and balances, an
independent juridical system, and independent
regulations. The absence of government credibility
not only increases uncertainty and risk in both the
private health care institution and the PPP
operation, but also decreases the credibility of the
public health care institution.
4. Financial accessibility: the financial accessibility
attribute reflects the availability of both domestic
and international capitals for both the private for-
profit/non-profit health care institution and the
public health care institution to finance a health care
project. A mature financial market can help both the
private for-profit/non-profit health care institution
and the public health care institution raise funds at
low cost and with low risk. A health care project
with high financing costs inevitably leads to the
expensive health care delivery and ultimately harms
social welfare.
5. Government capacity: the government capacity
attribute refers to the expertise, knowledge, and
information that the government and the public
health care institution have for negotiating,
operating, and supervising all types of health care
projects. Government capacity is a prerequisite for
both the government and the public health care
institution to initiate and manage a successful health
care project, and this type of health care project in
turn guarantees that the health care provision by the
private for-profit/non-profit health care institution
does not sacrifice either the public health care
institution’s interests or social welfare.
6. Centralized management: the centralized
management attribute reflects the centralization and
unification of the government’s participation in
health care provision, and it includes the
negotiation, approval, enforcement, and supervision.
A centralized regulatory framework is helpful for
eliminating the conflicts among the public healthcare institutions and providing the private for-profit
/non-profit health care institutions with a clear
guideline for interacting with both the government
and the public health care institutions.
7. Control of corruption: the control of corruption
attribute indicates the ability of the government to
prevent and control the corruption and lobbying. In
our study, corruption is defined as the exercise of
public power for private gain. Corruption and
lobbies may speed up the approval and enforcement
of the health care project, but they can destroy both
the fair market competition and the private for-
profit/non-profit investor’s confidence in the long
run. In recent years this problem has become more
and more serious in China and has greatly harmed
social welfare, so it is worth the concern of the
government and society as a whole.
Data
In order to collect the data for determining the optimal
solution to China’s institutional problem of health care
provider selection from various experts, after both the
general framework of China’s institutional problem of
health care provider selection and the range of optional
implementation methodologies were determined, this
study collaborated with the National Bureau of Statistics
of China to commission a large-scale 2009 to 2010
national expert survey through the organization of a pilot
health care provider research system in 19 provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under
the central government.
Under the support of the pilot health care provider
research system, this survey adopted the two-stage prob-
ability proportional to size (PPS) systematic sampling
technique to select a probability sample of 4,670 experts,
and they were divided into seven categories: doctors;
pharmacists; nurses; hospital administrators; health
officials in health administration departments; officials in
medical insurance agencies; and health care researchers
in colleges, universities, and research departments. In
this survey, the professional survey teams from the
National Bureau of Statistics and local Bureaus of Statistics
conducted the face-to-face interviews through the online
information system of the pilot health care provider
research system. The professional investigator usually
first invited the selected expert to fill out the survey
questionnaire in the online information system of the
pilot health care provider research system, no replace-
ment was made if the selected expert was away, refused
to be interviewed, or failed to be interviewed after
three attempts. If the selected expert agreed to fill out
the survey questionnaire in the online information system
of the pilot health care provider research system, but she/
he was unavailable, or disabled in a way that impeded her/
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expert that knew her/him best served as the respondent,
and this expert was also asked to report her/his assessed
values of the questions in the survey questionnaire
through the online information system of the pilot health
care provider research system in order to check bias. A
total of 3,914 valid responses were generated in the 2009 to
2010 national expert survey; they included 490 doctors, 481
pharmacists, 479 nurses, 483 hospital administrators, 603
health officials in health administration departments, 598
officials in medical insurance agencies, and 780 health care
researchers; the response rate was 83.81%.
The survey questionnaire consisted of three parts: the
first inquired about the respondent’s assessed values of
the composite weights of activity attributes, regulatory
attributes, market attributes, and strategic attributes; the
second inquired about the respondent’s assessed values of
the relative importance of activity attributes, regulatory
attributes, market attributes, and strategic attributes with
respect to criteria attributes; the third inquired about the
respondent’s assessed values of the relative preferences for
criteria attributes of alternatives with respect to activity
attributes, regulatory attributes, market attributes, and
strategic attributes. The contents of the survey question-
naire were determined on the basis of both the general
framework of China’s institutional problem of health care
provider selection and the range of optional implementa-
tion methodologies.
The use of the dataset was approved by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China.
Selection of the implementation methodology
A large number of implementation methodologies such
as the weighted point method [39], the matrix approach
[40], the vendor performance matrix approach [41], and
the vendor profile analysis [42] were adopted to evaluate
the qualifications of health care providers. These implemen-
tation methodologies were easy to implement, but were
overly simplistic, and the integration of both qualitative and
quantitative factors remained a central problem in these
implementation methodologies.
Many researchers usually adopted the more sophisticated
multi-attribute decision methodologies in the complex pro-
vider selection problem, and these types of implementation
methodologies involved the analytic hierarchy process
(AHP) [43,44], the multi-objective programming [45], and
the multi-attribute utility theory [46]. However, these earlier
implementation methodologies did not explicitly address
the interactions among decision factors. In the literature,
up till now, such interactions could be explicitly addressed
only using the analytic network process (ANP) [47-49].
The ANP, a general version of the AHP [50], could
further explicitly address the interactions among attributes
and sub-attributes in the complex provider selectionproblem [51-53]. The ANP evaluated the impact of the
dependency among elements through the development
of a “super matrix” that was likened to the Markov
chain [52], and this characteristic made ANP the only
implementation methodology that could address the inter-
dependent nature of the decision attributes [54,55]. The
strength of the ANP model was its ability to structure the
attributes and the corresponding problems in a systematic
manner that helped the decision maker discern the inter-
related aspects of the system [56].
Since China’s institutional problem of health care pro-
vider selection required an implementation methodology
that could handle possible interactions among decision
factors/constraints in a multi-stage setting, so far in the
literature only the ANP implementation methodology
could best achieve this difficult goal. The ANP was then
the optimal implementation methodology that could help
the decision maker effectively promote various experts’
views into various optimal solutions to China’s institutional
problem of health care provider selection.
Detailed description of the ANP implementation
methodology
After China’s institutional problem of health care provider
selection was transformed to an ANP problem, efficiency,
economy, effectiveness, and equity were treated as four
separate hierarchies (also four sub-goals that constituted
the overall goal) to determine the optimal health care
provider approach in the alternative cluster. In order to
solve the ANP formulation, the ANP problem for China’s
institutional problem of health care provider selection was
separated into two parts. In the first part the weights of
activity attributes, regulatory attributes, market attributes,
and strategic attributes were determined, and in the
second part the weights of alternatives were determined.
These two parts could be addressed in two phases, since
the activity cluster, the regulatory cluster, the market
cluster, and the strategic cluster did not depend on the
alternative cluster.
Determining the weights of attributes:
A super matrix for each hierarchy was constructed as
follows.









0 0 0 ⋯ 0 ⋯ 0
1 0 0 ⋯ 0 ⋯ 0
0 APC1 AC11 ⋯ AC1i ⋯ AC1K
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
0 APCi ACi1 ⋯ ACii ⋯ ACiK
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮





here Wh was the super matrix for hierarchy h, h = 1, 2,
3, and 4;
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P2 = (economy), P3 = (effectiveness), and P4 = (equity);
Ci represented the activity cluster, the regulatory cluster,
the market cluster, and the strategic cluster, with i = 1, 2, 3,
and 4, respectively;
APCi was the relative importance matrix of the cluster
Ci with respect to the criterion attribute Ph;
ACij was the relative importance matrix of the cluster
Ci with respect to the cluster Cj.
In order to derive the weights in the super matrix Wh,
pair wise comparisons between attributes were performed
in response to the following question: which of the two
attributes contributed more to the criterion attribute
Ph? Next, the clusters that were directly affected by
other clusters were found, and the relative importance
of these clusters to the leading cluster was determined.
Within the super matrix framework, the relative import-
ance of a column of clusters to the leading cluster in that
column was determined. The weights of the relative
importance of the clusters (in a column) were used to
normalize the attributes of the respective clusters in that
column. This maintained the unity property of the columns
of the super matrix. The super matrix Wh was then raised
to a large power. The relative weights of attributes with re-
spect to the criterion attribute Ph were given in the second
column of the converged matrixWh
∞.
Determining the weights of alternatives:
The relative priorities of alternatives with respect to
the criterion attribute Ph were obtained by:
Zh ¼ Ah  Mh
here Ah was the matrix representing the relative priorities
of alternatives with respect to their leading attributes for
hierarchy h; and Mh was the vector representing the
relative weights of attributes with respect to the criterion
attribute Ph, given in the second column of the converged
matrixWh
∞.
Next, the total outcome formula was used to combine the
respective results in the separate hierarchies [56]. The top-
ranked alternative for each hierarchy was rated and the four
ratings were normalized. Let b, c, d, and e be the respective
normalized ratings for efficiency, economy, effectiveness,
and equity. In this study efficiency, economy, effectiveness,
and equity were taken as equally important, then b, c, d,
and e were set to the same value 0.25. The relative priorities
of alternatives with respect to the overall goal were obtained
by computing the value of bZ1 + cZ2 + dZ3 + eZ4. It should
be noted that there were a variety of other approaches to
aggregate the Zh’s for the hierarchies [56].
Results
On the basis of the doctors’ average assessed values of
the composite weights of activity attributes, regulatoryattributes, market attributes, and strategic attributes in
the national expert survey, the composite weights in the
non-standardized super matrix of the ANP problem
were calculated and prepared in the first table. The
doctors’ average assessed values of the relative import-
ance of activity attributes, regulatory attributes, market
attributes, and strategic attributes with respect to criteria
attributes in the national expert survey were prepared in
the second table. Then the non-standardized super
matrix in the first table was weighted for each hierarchy
(refer to efficiency, economy, effectiveness, and equity)
according to the weights in the second table, as the result,
the limiting weighted super matrix for each hierarchy
that incorporated both inner-dependency effects and
inter-dependency effects was determined. The resulting
weights of the attributes (given in the second column of
the converged matrix Wh
∞) for each hierarchy were then
found and prepared in the third table.
The doctors’ average assessed values of the relative
preferences for criteria attributes of alternatives with
respect to activity attributes, regulatory attributes,
market attributes, and strategic attributes in the national
expert survey were prepared in the fourth table. Through
multiplying the third table and the fourth table, the
weights of alternatives with respect to efficiency, economy,
effectiveness, and equity were obtained and prepared in
the fifth table. The top-ranked weights for efficiency,
economy, effectiveness, and equity were then used to
normalize the matrix in the fifth table. The resulting
matrix for doctors is presented in Table 1.
On the basis of Table 1, from the doctors’ point of view,
the PPP approach (Alt 2) was the optimal approach in
terms of efficiency and equity; the market-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 3) was the optimal approach
in terms of economy; the traditional government’s
regulation-oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1)
was the optimal approach in terms of effectiveness; the
market-oriented health care provider approach (Alt 3) was
the optimal approach for the overall goal, the traditional
government’s regulation-oriented health care provider
approach (Alt 1) was the second-best approach for the
overall goal, and the PPP approach (Alt 2) was the
third-best approach for the overall goal.
Since the problem-solving processes for pharmacists,
nurses, hospital administrators, health officials in health
administration departments, officials in medical insurance
agencies, and health care researchers were similar to the
above problem-solving process for doctors, only the
resulting matrix for each category of experts was simply
presented as follows.
The resulting matrix for pharmacists is presented in
Table 2. On the basis of Table 2, from the pharmacists’
point of view, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) was the
Table 1 The resulting matrix for doctors
Efficiency Economy Effectiveness Equity Overall goal
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 bZ1 + cZ2 +
dZ3 + eZ4
Alt 1 0.996 0.786 1.000 0.984 0.942
Alt 2 1.000 0.810 0.943 1.000 0.938
Alt 3 0.959 1.000 0.913 0.936 0.952
Here b = c = d = e = 0.25.
Table 3 The resulting matrix for nurses
Efficiency Economy Effectiveness Equity Overall goal
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 bZ1 + cZ2 +
dZ3 + eZ4
Alt 1 0.904 0.734 1.000 1.000 0.909
Alt 2 1.000 0.785 0.905 0.991 0.920
Alt 3 0.977 1.000 0.911 0.787 0.919
Here b = c = d = e = 0.25.
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and equity; the market-oriented health care provider
approach (Alt 3) was the optimal approach in terms of
economy; the traditional government’s regulation-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 1) was the optimal
approach for the overall goal, the market-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 3) was the second-best
approach for the overall goal, and the PPP approach (Alt 2)
was the third-best approach for the overall goal.
The resulting matrix for nurses is presented in Table 3.
On the basis of Table 3, from the nurses’ point of view,
the PPP approach (Alt 2) was the optimal approach in
terms of efficiency; the market-oriented health care
provider approach (Alt 3) was the optimal approach in
terms of economy; the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) was the opti-
mal approach in terms of effectiveness and equity; the PPP
approach (Alt 2) was the optimal approach for the overall
goal, the market-oriented health care provider approach
(Alt 3) was the second-best approach for the overall goal,
and the traditional government’s regulation-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 1) was the third-best approach
for the overall goal.
The resulting matrix for hospital administrators is
presented in Table 4. On the basis of Table 4, from the
hospital administrators’ point of view, the PPP approach
(Alt 2) was the optimal approach in terms of efficiency;
the market-oriented health care provider approach (Alt 3)
was the optimal approach in terms of economy; the
traditional government’s regulation-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 1) was the optimal approach in
terms of effectiveness and equity; the traditional govern-
ment’s regulation-oriented health care provider approach
(Alt 1) was the optimal approach for the overall goal, the
market-oriented health care provider approach (Alt 3) was
the second-best approach for the overall goal, and theTable 2 The resulting matrix for pharmacists
Efficiency Economy Effectiveness Equity Overall goal
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 bZ1 + cZ2 +
dZ3 + eZ4
Alt 1 1.000 0.823 1.000 1.000 0.956
Alt 2 0.994 0.829 0.900 0.973 0.924
Alt 3 0.943 1.000 0.926 0.910 0.945
Here b = c = d = e = 0.25.PPP approach (Alt 2) was the third-best approach for
the overall goal.
The resulting matrix for health officials in health
administration departments is presented in Table 5. On the
basis of Table 5, from the point of view of health officials
in health administration departments, the traditional
government’s regulation-oriented health care provider
approach (Alt 1) was the optimal approach in terms of
efficiency and equity; the market-oriented health care
provider approach (Alt 3) was the optimal approach in
terms of economy and effectiveness; the traditional
government’s regulation-oriented health care provider
approach (Alt 1) was the optimal approach for the overall
goal, the market-oriented health care provider approach
(Alt 3) was the second-best approach for the overall goal,
and the PPP approach (Alt 2) was the third-best approach
for the overall goal.
The resulting matrix for officials in medical insurance
agencies is presented in Table 6. On the basis of Table 6,
from the point of view of officials in medical insurance
agencies, the PPP approach (Alt 2) was the optimal
approach in terms of efficiency; the market-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 3) was the optimal
approach in terms of economy; the traditional govern-
ment’s regulation-oriented health care provider approach
(Alt 1) was the optimal approach in terms of effectiveness
and equity; the PPP approach (Alt 2) was the optimal
approach for the overall goal, the market-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 3) was the second-best ap-
proach for the overall goal, and the traditional government’s
regulation-oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1)
was the third-best approach for the overall goal.
The resulting matrix for health care researchers is
presented in Table 7. On the basis of Table 7, from the
health care researchers’ point of view, the market-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 3) was the optimalTable 4 The resulting matrix for hospital administrators
Efficiency Economy Effectiveness Equity Overall goal
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 bZ1 + cZ2 +
dZ3 + eZ4
Alt 1 0.962 0.766 1.000 1.000 0.932
Alt 2 1.000 0.798 0.876 0.960 0.908
Alt 3 0.909 1.000 0.876 0.920 0.926
Here b = c = d = e = 0.25.
Table 5 The resulting matrix for health officials in health
administration departments
Efficiency Economy Effectiveness Equity Overall goal
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 bZ1 + cZ2 +
dZ3 + eZ4
Alt 1 1.000 0.876 0.997 1.000 0.968
Alt 2 0.993 0.904 0.925 0.878 0.925
Alt 3 0.918 1.000 1.000 0.903 0.955
Here b = c = d = e = 0.25.
Table 7 The resulting matrix for health care researchers
Efficiency Economy Effectiveness Equity Overall goal
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 bZ1 + cZ2 +
dZ3 + eZ4
Alt 1 0.971 0.832 1.000 0.979 0.945
Alt 2 0.999 0.907 0.941 1.000 0.962
Alt 3 1.000 1.000 0.880 0.921 0.950
Here b = c = d = e = 0.25.
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traditional government’s regulation-oriented health care
provider approach (Alt 1) was the optimal approach in
terms of effectiveness; the PPP approach (Alt 2) was the
optimal approach in terms of equity; the PPP approach
(Alt 2) was the optimal approach for the overall goal, the
market-oriented health care provider approach (Alt 3) was
the second-best approach for the overall goal, and the
traditional government’s regulation-oriented health care
provider approach (Alt 1) was the third-best approach for
the overall goal.
Discussion
Sensitivity tests of criteria attributes
In this study, four sub-goals of China’s institutional
problem of health care provider selection involving
efficiency, economy, effectiveness, and equity were taken
as equally important. But in the reality, the decision
maker usually needed to focus on the most important
current sub-goals, then the sub-goals of efficiency,
economy, effectiveness, and equity were usually taken as
unequally important, and the respective normalized
ratings for efficiency, economy, effectiveness, and equity
were usually different. So this study further underwent
sensitivity tests of criteria attributes in order to explore
to what extent the weights of criteria attributes influenced
the optimal solution to China’s institutional problem of
health care provider selection.
In the sensitivity tests of criteria attributes, the test
interval for the weight of each criterion attribute was
chosen to be from 0.00 to 1.00, and it was stipulated that
if the weight of the target criterion attribute was x, then
the weights of the other three criteria attributes were set
to (1-x)/3.Table 6 The resulting matrix for officials in medical
insurance agencies
Efficiency Economy Effectiveness Equity Overall goal
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 bZ1 + cZ2 +
dZ3 + eZ4
Alt 1 0.803 0.667 1.000 1.000 0.868
Alt 2 1.000 0.859 0.871 0.996 0.931
Alt 3 0.815 1.000 0.753 0.976 0.886
Here b = c = d = e = 0.25.The results of sensitivity tests for doctors are presented
in Figure 2.
After efficiency was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of efficiency attribute dropped to
less than 0.41, the market-oriented health care provider ap-
proach (Alt 3) turned into the optimal approach; when the
weight of efficiency attribute was in the interval [0.42, 0.58],
the traditional government’s regulation-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into the optimal
approach; when the weight of efficiency attribute rose to
more than 0.59, the PPP approach (Alt 2) turned into
the optimal approach.
After economy was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of economy attribute dropped
to less than 0.21, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into
the optimal approach; when the weight of economy
attribute rose to more than 0.22, the market-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into the
optimal approach; however, the PPP approach (Alt 2)
was always the non-optimal approach.
After effectiveness was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of effectiveness attribute
dropped to less than 0.33, the market-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into the optimal
approach; when the weight of effectiveness attribute rose
to more than 0.34, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into
the optimal approach; however, the PPP approach (Alt 2)
was always the non-optimal approach.
After equity was selected as the target criterion attribute,
when the weight of equity attribute dropped to less than
0.38, the market-oriented health care provider approach
(Alt 3) turned into the optimal approach; when the
weight of equity attribute rose to more than 0.39, the
PPP approach (Alt 2) turned into the optimal approach;
however, the traditional government’s regulation-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 1) was always the non-
optimal approach.
The results of sensitivity tests for pharmacists are
presented in Figure 3.
After efficiency was selected as the target criterion attri-
bute, when the weight of efficiency attribute dropped to
less than 0.07, the market-oriented health care provider
approach (Alt 3) turned into the optimal approach; when
Figure 2 Sensitivity tests for doctors.
Figure 3 Sensitivity tests for pharmacists.
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the traditional government’s regulation-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into the optimal
approach; however, the PPP approach (Alt 2) was always
the non-optimal approach.
After economy was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of economy attribute dropped to
less than 0.29, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into
the optimal approach; when the weight of economy
attribute rose to more than 0.30, the market-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into the
optimal approach; however, the PPP approach (Alt 2)
was always the non-optimal approach.
After effectiveness was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of effectiveness attribute
dropped to less than 0.11, the market-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into the optimal
approach; when the weight of effectiveness attribute rose
to more than 0.12, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into
the optimal approach; however, the PPP approach (Alt 2)
was always the non-optimal approach.
After equity was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of equity attribute dropped to
less than 0.14, the market-oriented health care provider
approach (Alt 3) turned into the optimal approach; when
the weight of equity attribute rose to more than 0.15,
the traditional government’s regulation-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into the optimal
approach; however, the PPP approach (Alt 2) was always
the non-optimal approach.
The results of sensitivity tests for nurses are presented
in Figure 4.
After efficiency was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of efficiency attribute dropped
to less than 0.14, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into
the optimal approach; when the weight of efficiency attri-
bute was in the interval [0.15, 0.19], the market-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into the
optimal approach; when the weight of efficiency attribute
rose to more than 0.20, the PPP approach (Alt 2) turned
into the optimal approach.
After economy was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of economy attribute dropped
to less than 0.04, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into
the optimal approach; when the weight of economy
attribute was in the interval [0.05, 0.25], the PPP approach
(Alt 2) turned into the optimal approach; when the weight
of economy attribute rose to more than 0.26, the market-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into
the optimal approach.After effectiveness was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of effectiveness attribute
dropped to less than 0.32, the PPP approach (Alt 2) turned
into the optimal approach; when the weight of effectiveness
attribute rose to more than 0.33, the traditional govern-
ment’s regulation-oriented health care provider approach
(Alt 1) turned into the optimal approach; however, the
market-oriented health care provider approach (Alt 3) was
always the non-optimal approach.
After equity was selected as the target criterion attribute,
when the weight of equity attribute dropped to less than
0.24, the market-oriented health care provider approach
(Alt 3) turned into the optimal approach; when the weight
of equity attribute was in the interval [0.25, 0.65], the PPP
approach (Alt 2) turned into the optimal approach;
when the weight of equity attribute rose to more than
0.66, the traditional government’s regulation-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into the
optimal approach.
The results of sensitivity tests for hospital administrators
are presented in Figure 5.
After efficiency was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of efficiency attribute dropped
to less than 0.15, the market-oriented health care provider
approach (Alt 3) turned into the optimal approach;
when the weight of efficiency attribute was in the interval
[0.16, 0.53], the traditional government’s regulation-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into the
optimal approach; when the weight of efficiency attribute
rose to more than 0.54, the PPP approach (Alt 2) turned
into the optimal approach.
After economy was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of economy attribute dropped
to less than 0.26, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into
the optimal approach; when the weight of economy
attribute rose to more than 0.27, the market-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into the
optimal approach; however, the PPP approach (Alt 2)
was always the non-optimal approach.
After effectiveness was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of effectiveness attribute
dropped to less than 0.21, the market-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into the optimal
approach; when the weight of effectiveness attribute
rose to more than 0.22, the traditional government’s
regulation-oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1)
turned into the optimal approach; however, the PPP
approach (Alt 2) was always the non-optimal approach.
After equity was selected as the target criterion attribute,
when the weight of equity attribute dropped to less than
0.19, the market-oriented health care provider approach
(Alt 3) turned into the optimal approach; when the weight
of equity attribute rose to more than 0.20, the traditional
Figure 5 Sensitivity tests for hospital administrators.
Figure 4 Sensitivity tests for nurses.
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approach (Alt 1) turned into the optimal approach;
however, the PPP approach (Alt 2) was always the non-
optimal approach.
The results of sensitivity tests for health officials in health
administration departments are presented in Figure 6.
After efficiency was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of efficiency attribute dropped
to less than 0.10, the market-oriented health care provider
approach (Alt 3) turned into the optimal approach; when
the weight of efficiency attribute rose to more than 0.11,
the traditional government’s regulation-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into the optimal
approach; however, the PPP approach (Alt 2) was always
the non-optimal approach.
After economy was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of economy attribute dropped to
less than 0.32, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into
the optimal approach; when the weight of economy
attribute rose to more than 0.33, the market-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into the
optimal approach; however, the PPP approach (Alt 2)
was always the non-optimal approach.
After effectiveness was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of effectiveness attribute
dropped to less than 0.85, the traditional government’s
regulation-oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1)Figure 6 Sensitivity tests for health officials in health administration dturned into the optimal approach; when the weight of
effectiveness attribute rose to more than 0.86, the market-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into
the optimal approach; however, the PPP approach (Alt 2)
was always the non-optimal approach.
After equity was selected as the target criterion attribute,
when the weight of equity attribute dropped to less than
0.13, the market-oriented health care provider approach
(Alt 3) turned into the optimal approach; when the weight
of equity attribute rose to more than 0.14, the traditional
government’s regulation-oriented health care provider
approach (Alt 1) turned into the optimal approach;
however, the PPP approach (Alt 2) was always the non-
optimal approach.
The results of sensitivity tests for officials in medical
insurance agencies are presented in Figure 7.
After efficiency was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of efficiency attribute dropped to
less than 0.005, the market-oriented health care provider
approach (Alt 3) turned into the optimal approach; when
the weight of efficiency attribute rose to more than 0.01,
the PPP approach (Alt 2) turned into the optimal approach;
however, the traditional government’s regulation-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 1) was always the non-
optimal approach.
After economy was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of economy attribute dropped
to less than 0.43, the PPP approach (Alt 2) turned into theepartments.
Figure 7 Sensitivity tests for officials in medical insurance agencies.
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rose to more than 0.44, the market-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into the optimal
approach; however, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) was always
the non-optimal approach.
After effectiveness was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of effectiveness attribute
dropped to less than 0.49, the PPP approach (Alt 2)
turned into the optimal approach; when the weight of
effectiveness attribute rose to more than 0.50, the
traditional government’s regulation-oriented health care
provider approach (Alt 1) turned into the optimal ap-
proach; however, the market-oriented health care provider
approach (Alt 3) was always the non-optimal approach.
After equity was selected as the target criterion attribute,
when the weight of equity attribute dropped to less than
0.95, the PPP approach (Alt 2) turned into the optimal
approach; when the weight of equity attribute rose to
more than 0.96, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) turned
into the optimal approach; however, the market-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 3) was always the non-
optimal approach.
The results of sensitivity tests for health care researchers
are presented in Figure 8.
After efficiency was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of efficiency attribute droppedto less than 0.94, the PPP approach (Alt 2) turned into the
optimal approach; when the weight of efficiency attribute
rose to more than 0.94, the market-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into the optimal
approach; however, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) was always
the non-optimal approach.
After economy was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of economy attribute dropped
to less than 0.04, the traditional government’s regulation-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into
the optimal approach; when the weight of economy attri-
bute was in the interval [0.05, 0.33], the PPP approach
(Alt 2) turned into the optimal approach; when the weight
of economy attribute rose to more than 0.34, the market-
oriented health care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into
the optimal approach.
After effectiveness was selected as the target criterion
attribute, when the weight of effectiveness attribute
dropped to less than 0.07, the market-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 3) turned into the optimal
approach; when the weight of effectiveness attribute was
in the interval [0.08, 0.41], the PPP approach (Alt 2)
turned into the optimal approach; when the weight of
effectiveness attribute rose to more than 0.42, the
traditional government’s regulation-oriented health
care provider approach (Alt 1) turned into the optimal
approach.
Figure 8 Sensitivity tests for health care researchers.
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when the weight of equity attribute dropped to less than
0.12, the market-oriented health care provider approach
(Alt 3) turned into the optimal approach; when the
weight of equity attribute rose to more than 0.13, the
PPP approach (Alt 2) turned into the optimal approach;
however, the traditional government’s regulation-oriented
health care provider approach (Alt 1) was always the non-
optimal approach.
In summary, the results of sensitivity tests for any
category of experts revealed that the optimal solution
to China’s institutional problem of health care provider
selection was sensitive to the respective normalized ratings
for the sub-goals of efficiency, economy, effectiveness,
and equity.
Limitations of this study
Although this study not only organized a pilot health
care provider research system to collect the large-scale
data for determining the optimal solution to China’s
institutional problem of health care provider selection
from various experts for the first time in China, but also
applied the ANP implementation methodology to help
the decision maker effectively promote various experts’
views into various optimal solutions to China’s institu-
tional problem of health care provider selection on the
basis of this large-scale data, it would still be worthwhile
to apply the ANP implementation methodology to help
the decision maker solve China’s institutional problem ofhealth care provider selection through the organization
of a formal health care provider research system in
further research. The further research should also use a
comprehensive sensitivity analysis to examine the signifi-
cance of the weights of criteria attributes with respect to
the decision for the selection of health care providers,
on the basis of such a sensitivity analysis the decision
maker could better understand to what extent the respect-
ive normalized ratings for the sub-goals of efficiency,
economy, effectiveness, and equity influenced the optimal
solution to China’s institutional problem of health care
provider selection. If a new implementation methodology
that could better handle possible interactions among deci-
sion factors/constraints in a multi-stage setting would be
developed in future, it would also be worthwhile to apply
this implementation methodology to help the decision
maker effectively promote various experts’ views into vari-
ous optimal solutions to China’s institutional problem of
health care provider selection through the organization of
the health care provider research system.
Conclusions
Under the support of the ANP implementation method-
ology that could best handle the possible interactions
among decision factors/constraints in the multi-stage
setting in China’s institutional problem of health care
provider selection, the data collected through a pilot
health care provider research system in the 2009 to 2010
national expert survey could help the decision maker
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optimal solutions to China’s institutional problem of
health care provider selection.
After China’s institutional problem of health care
provider selection was transformed to an ANP problem,
through analyzing the dataset from the 2009 to 2010
national expert survey, this study obtained the following
main results: the market-oriented health care provider
approach was the optimal solution to China’s institutional
problem of health care provider selection from the
doctors’ point of view; the traditional government’s
regulation-oriented health care provider approach was
the optimal solution to China’s institutional problem of
health care provider selection from the pharmacists’
point of view, the hospital administrators’ point of
view, and the point of view of health officials in health
administration departments; the PPP approach was the
optimal solution to China’s institutional problem of
health care provider selection from the nurses’ point of
view, the point of view of officials in medical insurance
agencies, and the health care researchers’ point of view.
The sensitivity tests revealed that the optimal solution
to China’s institutional problem of health care provider
selection was sensitive to the respective normalized ratings
for the sub-goals of efficiency, economy, effectiveness,
and equity.
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